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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
Four Scenarios for 
the Crisis in Belarus
As protests continue to galvanize Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko  
is consolidating his grip on power. Volatile domestic dynamics – 
and Russia’s reactions to them – will shape the discredited regime’s 
future. This paper outlines four possible scenarios for Belarus up 
to one year from now. They include options for Russia and the EU, 
whose strategic objectives differ, but whose short-term interests 
align: preventing bloodshed, avoiding open geopolitical conflict,  
and preparing for a post-Lukashenko transition.
 – Frozen Belarus: The regime survives with Russia’s help but 
without a bloody crackdown. Control over society is restored 
but remains fragile. Economic crisis triggers new unrest. The 
EU maintains sanctions and supports civil society but has little 
room for maneuver in Belarus.
 – Slow-Moving, Transitional Belarus: After his inauguration, 
President Lukashenko announces a political transition. A new 
constitution is adopted, and elections are held in 2021. While 
opposition is tolerated, the transition is dominated by regime 
elites who champion their favored candidates. Both Russia and 
some member states of the EU are actively involved.
 – Blood-Soaked Belarus: Protests continue, provoking a large-
scale, violent crackdown with many fatalities. Internal conflicts 
grow within the regime. Moscow keeps dominating the process 
via its links to Belarusian security elites. The EU’s role is limited 
to damage control. 
 – Force Majeure in Belarus: Lukashenko leaves his post unexpect-
edly and presidential elections must be held within 70 days. 
Independent candidates backed by various external players run; 
a politician who is supported by Russia wins. The EU prefers to 
rely on the OSCE rather than act on its own. 
No. 16
August 2020
András Rácz
Senior Research Fellow on Russia, 
Robert Bosch Center for Central 
and Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Central Asia
Cristina Gherasimov
Research Fellow, Robert Bosch 
Center for Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia, and Central Asia
Milan Nič
Head, Robert Bosch Center  
for Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and Central Asia
Belarus Crisis: Four Scenarios
2
POLICY BRIEF
No. 16 | August 2020
DANGEROUS DEADLOCK AND 
DEEPENING POLITICAL CRISIS
In the aftermath of presidential elections on August 
9, 2020, which were followed by massive demonstra-
tions and brutal repressions, the situation in Belarus 
has moved into a dangerous deadlock. While Presi-
dent Alexander Lukashenko has managed to prevent 
the immediate collapse of his regime,1 he has not 
succeeded in calming the nationwide protests. Op-
position demonstrations have been fueled by both 
the announcement of election results that were – 
even by the standards of Lukashenko’s 26-year rule – 
extremely falsified and unprecedented post-election 
violence by police forces. 
Widespread, brutal repressions infuriated and mo-
bilized a broader spectrum of Belarusian society 
against the regime, including citizens who had pre-
viously been apolitical.2 This was true not only in 
Minsk, but also in the countryside.3 Unlike in previ-
ous years, these protests are prevailing.
In order to understand this phenomenon, one needs 
to note that the domestic legitimacy of Lukashenko’s 
regime has not been determined by elections since 
1996. Rather, its legitimacy was based on a function-
ing social contract, financed by Russian subsidies, 
that provided relative well-being for Belarusian cit-
izens in exchange for their political passivity. A deep 
political crisis had been building for years stoked by 
the long-term economic stagnation of the 2010s, the 
lack of any prospective for reform, Russia’s reluc-
tance to keep financing the Belarusian regime, and, 
most recently, Lukashenko’s failed management of 
the coronavirus crisis. The events around the elec-
tions on August 9 then catalyzed pent-up grievances 
resulting from these developments.
Going forward, both the Lukashenko regime and the 
opposition lack full legitimacy inside and outside 
Belarus. The numerous violations of transparency 
before, during, and after the recent elections make 
the actual result of the vote impossible to define. 
1  The European Union does not recognize the results of the presidential elections held on August 9, 2020, in Belarus. Hence, when the text refers to 
Alexander Lukashenko as president, it is merely done in order to refer to the position he currently holds without recognizing the legitimacy of his presidency.
2  Vadim Mojeiko, “Three main threats to the Lukashenka regime now,” Belarus Digest, August 16, 2020:  
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/three-main-threats-to-the-lukashenka-regime-now/> (accessed August 25, 2020).
3  Alena Mikhalkovich, “Protesters in rural Belarus took the authorities by surprise,” Belarus Digest, August 18, 2020:  
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/protesters-in-rural-belarus-took-the-authorities-by-surprise/> (accessed August 25, 2020).
4  Alexandra Brzozowski, “‘Belarus has woken up,’ opposition leader Tikhanovskaya tells EU lawmakers,” Euractiv, August 25, 2020: <https://www.euractiv.
com/section/eastern-europe/news/belarus-has-woken-up-opposition-leader-tikhanovskaya-tells-eu-lawmakers/> (accessed August 25, 2020). 
5  Pointed out even by prominent Russian analysts, such as: Dmitri Trenin, “Game Over for Lukashenko: The Kremlin’s Next Move,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 
August 17, 2020 <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82493> (accessed August 25, 2020).
6  Two people were killed by the police while a third person died in police custody. Several others are still missing.
Consequently, no one – neither Lukashenko nor op-
position candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya – can 
rightfully claim victory. Tikhanovskaya’s recent dec-
laration at the extraordinary meeting of the Europe-
an Parliament on August 25 that “We are the majority 
now”4 is as unsubstantiated by reliable and represen-
tative data as the presidency of Lukashenko.
The unprecedented police violence that followed the 
elections on August 9 – even when compared to the 
forceful disbursement of protests after those in 2006 
and 2010 – has also contributed to Lukashenko’s 
loss of presidential legitimacy among considerable 
parts of Belarusian society.5 At least three protest-
ers lost their lives,6 hundreds were injured, and thou-
sands suffered from arbitrary arrests, beatings, and, 
in certain cases, systematic torture documented 
and broadcasted via social media. Still, Lukashenko’s 
threatening behavior on August 23, when he posed 
with an automatic rifle, demonstrated that he would 
hold on to power for as long as possible.  
Meanwhile, because the opposition has little insti-
tutionalization, its Coordination Council can hardly 
constitute a credible political alternative. The oppo-
sition’s lack of democratic political experience and 
shortage of resources, as well as the somewhat un-
planned presidential candidacy of Tikhanovskaya, all 
play a role. As does the fact that the Council oper-
ates partially from Lithuania, which gives the regime 
the opportunity to accuse Council members of being 
the agents of foreign powers and instigating a “color 
revolution.” Moreover, the regime’s repressions and 
threats are preventing many important actors, par-
ticularly business players, from supporting the Coor-
dination Council. 
Demonstrations, Strikes, and Coherence  
of the Siloviki
The current protests are unique in two ways. First, 
except for the first few nights, the demonstrations 
have remained peaceful. Thus, police violence has 
been unilateral, which further erodes the regime’s 
domestic legitimacy. Second, the protests have been 
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supported by strikes in several crucial enterprises 
operated by the Belarusian state. These strikes have 
the potential to become particularly dangerous to 
the regime because they affect the already stagnat-
ing economy. Also, the police cannot simply repress 
them because the regime is evidently unable to re-
place workers.
The sustainability of the strikes is, in fact, one of 
the key domestic factors that will define the possi-
ble outcomes of the current political stalemate. At 
this writing, strikes appear to be losing momentum, 
mostly due to a sophisticated combination of threats 
from the regime and the lack of financial resourc-
es to compensate the salaries lost by striking work-
ers. Given that strike committees have already been 
formed, a second wave of strikes cannot, however, be 
ruled out.
The other main domestic driver of developments 
in Belarus is the siloviki, particularly the question 
of whether these security forces will remain loyal 
to Lukashenko. During the two weeks following the 
election, Lukashenko has largely managed to consol-
idate his power and, so far, has kept defections to a 
minimum. Parts of the Belarusian state bureaucracy 
are hedging, cautiously measuring their chances. But 
as long as the regime remains solid, so does the loy-
alty of the bureaucratic elites. Lukashenko has flatly 
refused any compromise or negotiation with the op-
position, indicating that domestic political tensions 
will be prolonged. The longer the face-off between 
protesters and police forces continues, however, the 
more likely that cracks will appear in the loyalty of 
the security apparatus. This particularly concerns 
the army, which is largely composed of conscripts, 
and police personnel in the countryside who, be-
cause they live in the communities in which they 
serve, have close ties to the locals.
7  Fyodor Lukyanov, “Сами с усами: происходящее в Белоруссии вызвано внутренними причинами, а не внешними” [Yourself with a Moustache:  
Events in Belarus are Caused by Internal Causes, Not External Ones], Россия в глобальной политике [Russia in Global Affairs], August 10, 2020:  
<https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/sami-s-usami/> (accessed August 25, 2020).
8  Igor Okunev, Marianna Shestakova, Emma Bibina, “Минск и вся остальная страна: территориальная дифференциация електорального поведения 
жителей Белоруссии” [Minsk and the Rest of the Country: Territorial Differentiation of Electoral Behavior of the Inhabitants of Belarus], Россия в 
глобальной политике [Russia in Global Affairs], August 19, 2020:  
<https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/differencziacziya-belorussii/> (accessed August 25, 2020).
9  Lukyanov, ibid.
10  The arrest of 33 operatives of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, by Belarusian authorities on July 29, 2020, only infuriated Russia 
even further. Lukashenko used these arrests to accuse Moscow of trying to interfere in the presidential elections. After the elections, and following two 
direct phone conversations between Lukashenko and Putin, the Wagner operatives were released without any charges.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The current crisis in Belarus has the potential to 
result in destabilizing consequences for the EU’s 
eastern neighborhood for years to come. Ongo-
ing tensions in Belarus are not, however, the result 
of geopolitical choices, as they were in the case of 
Ukraine. Rather, they have been driven solely by do-
mestic political considerations.7 As both Belarusian 
and Russian experts, as well as a detailed Russian so-
ciological survey, point out, geopolitical consider-
ations did not play a role in the election campaign.8 
Because the candidates did not represent competing 
geopolitical choices between Russia and the West, 
the current situation in Belarus cannot be described 
as a color revolution – a fact noted even by a prom-
inent Russian analyst close to the Kremlin.9 Instead, 
the campaign focused exclusively on domestic polit-
ical issues.
Russia: Despite Strong Interests and Leverage, 
Deadlock Remains
Unlike the EU, Russia has multifaceted, well-institu-
tionalized channels of immediate influence over the 
Belarusian regime, particularly over its security ap-
paratus and considerable parts of its economy. Also, 
Russia has strong, strategic interests in and over the 
country that are in line with its foreign policy toward 
the post-Soviet space, namely preserving the coher-
ence of the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union. In addi-
tion, Moscow intends to prevent the eastward ex-
pansion of NATO and the EU.
When it comes to questions of who becomes the 
leader of neighboring countries, Moscow usually 
prefers to make personalized choices instead of 
merely relying on its institutional leverage or tra-
ditional dependencies. Since the outbreak of the 
crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenko has conduct-
ed a delicate balancing act between Russia and the 
West. While this has long been tolerated by Moscow, 
Lukashenko, who was never an easy partner, has in-
creasingly become a serious irritant.10 Hence, Russia’s 
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main objective in the August 2020 presidential elec-
tions was apparently to keep Lukashenko in power 
but weaken him enough to downgrade his geopoliti-
cal maneuvering, making him much more vulnerable 
to pushes for deeper economic (and possibly mili-
tary) integration with Russia under the framework of 
the Union State. 
Following this objective, Russia actively supported 
all the significant opposition candidates in the pres-
idential elections, albeit to varying degrees and by 
different means that were not necessarily coordi-
nated by the Kremlin. Various Russian corporate and 
other interests backed all the new opposition can-
didates. Meanwhile, Russia’s often biased and opin-
ionated state media covered the Belarusian election 
campaign largely objectively, sometimes even with 
sympathy for several opposition candidates.
Still, the intensity and extent of the current crisis 
surprised Moscow, as evidenced by Russian Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin’s swift congratulation of 
Lukashenko on August 10,11 which considerably nar-
rowed Moscow’s maneuvering space. While the 
Kremlin will do its utmost to keep Belarus in its own 
geopolitical sphere, it prefers to keep the costs of 
this effort not only as low as possible, but also co-
vert. Thus, in the short term, the Kremlin will give 
Lukashenko time to take action. Its preferred scenar-
io is a managed transition that does not lead polar-
ized Belarus toward a breaking point.12
A Disengaged US and a Cautious EU
In contrast to its role in previous upheavals in the 
EU’s eastern neighborhood, the United States is, at 
present, largely concentrating on its own domestic 
issues. Though the visit of Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo to Minsk in February 2020 marked an im-
portant milestone in bilateral US-Belarusian rela-
tions, the ongoing presidential election campaign 
currently hampers the efficiency of the US admin-
istration. While its slow response to the Belarus cri-
sis is part of this trend, Deputy Secretary of State 
Stephen Biegun’s visit to Vilnius and Moscow from 
August 24 to 27, 2020, was a sign that Washington is 
still paying close attention and considering its op-
tions. At the same time, both Moscow and Minsk 
11  Президент России [President of Russia], “Поздравление Александру Лукашенко с победой на выборах Президента Белоруссии,” [Congratulations 
to Alexander Lukashenko for his Victory in the Presidential Elections in Belarus], August 10, 2020:  
<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63872> (accessed August 25, 2020).
12  Henry Foy, Max Seddon, “Putin prepares for a controlled succession in Belarus,” Financial Times, August 20, 2020:  
<https://www.ft.com/content/53c4f8ec-c2da-48db-9459-6dc717e79b9c> (accessed August 25, 2020).
13  Maxim Samorukov, “Can Russia-West Divide Save ‘Europe’s Last Dictator’ in Belarus?”, Carnegie Moscow Center, August 10, 2020:  
<https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82447> (accessed August 25, 2020).
are aware that Biegun represents an administration 
whose future is uncertain.
Meanwhile, the European Union’s attitude toward 
the Lukashenko regime was fundamentally altered 
by the post-election violence. Previously, the cri-
sis in Ukraine – and particularly the mediating role 
Minsk played in it – had made the EU remarkably 
more tolerant of Lukashenko’s authoritarian practic-
es.13 The EU lifted most of its sanctions on Belarus 
in 2016, for example. The August 19 declaration by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other EU 
leaders about the EU’s non-recognition of the 
Belarusian elections, however, makes it impossible to 
return to the pre-2014 status quo, i.e. the tacit rec-
ognition of Lukashenko despite his authoritarian 
practices in exchange for geopolitical benefits.
The leverage of the European Union in and on Belarus 
is limited both in terms of capacity and willingness. 
Due to the lack of a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, bilateral relations are only institutional-
ized at a low level. Financial assistance from the EU is 
marginal compared to the subsidies Belarus receives 
from Russia. Moreover, the EU’s interest in ensuring 
that Belarus is able to maintain its sovereignty lim-
its the EU’s ability to engage in any actions that could 
result in a large-scale Russian takeover effort. All 
in all, while certain EU member states are able and 
willing to devote considerable political resources to 
Belarus, the EU as a whole is less so.
Please note:  The Republic of Belarus 
recognizes two official languages, Bela- 
rusian and Russian. The choice of trans-
l i te r a t i n g  B e l a r u s i a n  n a m e s  o n  t h e 
basis of their Russian equivalents was made 
here in order to help the wider public more 
easily comprehend the situation in Belarus; 
thus, it does not represent any political or 
other preference.
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Four  
Scenarios for 
Belarus
Based on the current situation, domestic dynam-
ics are likely to remain the primary determinant of 
political developments in Belarus. Certain domestic 
dynamics, however, will cause external powers – not 
only Russia, which is the main player, but also the EU – 
to get involved to various degrees in order to secure 
their interests. Four distinct scenarios are outlined 
below for the development of Belarus over the next 
three to twelve months. It was not among the objec-
tives of this paper to define the probability of each of 
them, but we have indicated where Russia’s actions 
may be decisive.14
SCENARIO 1: FROZEN BELARUS
Situation: 
Following a broad but not extremely 
violent crackdown, Lukashenko stays in 
power with substantial help from Russia. 
Protests remain peaceful but gradually die down. Re-
pressions and human rights abuses continue but re-
main selective and not outrageously brutal. Silovik 
elites remain loyal to the regime, forcing many po-
litical activists to leave the country to avoid getting 
detained. Control over society is restored but very 
fragile. A crisis of legitimacy prevails both within the 
country and vis-à-vis the West. In terms of foreign 
policy, as relations with the EU stagnate, Russia and 
China become Belarus’s only remaining, prospective 
partners. Subsidies arrive only from Russia, but their 
amount is decreasing due to the mounting problems 
of Russia’s own economy. The deepening econom-
ic crisis, as well as the sustained legitimacy deficit, 
make a second wave of unrest highly likely. Its most 
probable culmination is the local elections scheduled 
for 2022. As the dynamics of the domestic situation 
remain volatile in this scenario, the geopolitical in-
terests of external actors play a key role.
14  The authors would like to express their gratitude for the insightful comments they received from participants of the expert digital workshop held on 
August 24, particularly Balazs Jarabik, Olga Dryndova, Liana Fix, Sarah Pagung, Ingo Petz, Astrid Sahm, Susan Stewart, and Jakob Wöllenstein.
Foreseeable interests and actions  
of Russia:
Moscow is interested in keeping Belarus 
weak and isolated from the West. Russia 
keeps assisting Lukashenko to stay in power, pref-
erably by covert, non-military means, such as me-
dia manipulation and security assistance. Moscow 
provides the subsidies necessary to sustain the ba-
sic functionality of the regime in the short term. Due 
to the inherent economic hardships of Russia, how-
ever, sufficient subsidies are not sustainable in the 
long run. Hence, the Kremlin needs to prepare for 
a second wave of unrest, most likely by building up 
a strong presidential candidate whom it can utilize 
once the situation matures for it.
Role of the EU: 
The EU initially maintains targeted 
sanctions while increasing the amount 
of assistance that it redirects to civil so-
ciety. Meanwhile, the prolonged stalemate gives the 
27 EU member states an opportunity to rethink their 
policy toward Belarus going forward. Preserving EU 
unity on sanctions between Belarus’s deeply engaged 
neighbors (Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia) on the one 
hand and more distant members (France and oth-
ers) on the other will be hard. Doing so will require 
even more diplomatic efforts by Germany, as well 
as by EU High Representative/Vice-President Josep 
Borrell and President of the European Council Pres-
ident Charles Michel – both of whose capacities are 
already overstretched by other crises. Short-term 
measures acceptable to the whole EU-27 could in-
clude a special solidarity fund (or European Endow-
ment for Democracy) to be set up to support the 
Belarusian opposition. Simultaneously, the EU cap-
itals could try to limit the emigration of Belarusian 
youth and elites by various means, such as provid-
ing scholarships conditional on a subsequent return 
to Belarus, or providing financial support to inde-
pendent media channels and NGOs operating in the 
country. As long as these actions remain low-profile 
and do not fundamentally endanger Lukashenko’s 
rule, the regime and Russia are both likely to largely 
tolerate them. A major crackdown might be more ex-
pensive politically than the profits it would bring. 
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SCENARIO 2: SLOW-MOVING, 
TRANSITIONAL BELARUS
Situation: 
At his  presidentia l  inaugurat ion, 
Lukashenko announces a political tran-
sition, reform of the constitution, and a 
referendum on it. He promises new elections to be 
held in one to two years. The opposition will not be 
forcibly oppressed, but it will remain co-opted as 
Lukashenko is unlikely to recognize the legitimacy 
of the Coordination Council. The transition is con-
ducted under the control of the regime while the 
silovik and bureaucratic elites champion their own 
candidates. In foreign policy, the balancing strategy 
is restored via political dialogue with and economic 
assistance from the EU, making this scenario geopo-
litically intensive.
Foreseeable interests and actions  
of Russia: 
Moscow’s key interests are to ensure 
that Belarus’s geopolitical orientation 
does not change and Minsk does not loosen its ties 
to the Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, and Union 
State. The longer the transition takes, the more 
Moscow is going to be able to utilize its influence 
and increasingly steer the events. Still, the transition 
will remain dominated by the domestic dynamics in 
Belarus. A too deep constitutional reform is against 
the interest of Moscow: instead of establishing a par-
liamentary democracy, Russia prefers to preserve the 
presidential or semi-presidential system. Moscow 
promotes economic reforms that open Belarus up to 
Russian capital, but not to the West or China. 
Role of the EU: 
Due to a lengthy and largely peaceful 
domestic transition process, the rel-
ative importance of Belarus in EU for-
eign policy decreases. The EU’s core interest is to 
ensure a managed, stable transition. With regard 
to constitutional reform, the EU intends to move 
Belarus toward a semi-presidential or parliamen-
tarian system. Strengthening civil society is a key 
tool for fostering the long-term pluralization of the 
Belarusian political system. Economic reforms and 
privatization will be crucial objectives to achieve. In 
practice, however, encouraging European investment 
will be dependent on the depth of reforms related to 
the market economy and, particularly, the rule of law. 
15  OMON is a Belarusian law enforcement unit under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The EU also provides economic and humanitarian 
assistance and keeps its sanctions in place until dem-
ocratic elections are held. Meanwhile, both Russia 
and the EU foster a gradual, negotiated transition, 
which is in their shared interests.
SCENARIO 3: BLOOD-SOAKED  
BELARUS
Situation: 
Silovik elites cannot keep the tensions 
between the regime and society low. 
Demonstrations and strikes not only 
continue, but also become larger and increasingly 
violent. Meanwhile, Lukashenko keeps refusing any 
compromise. In several places and on several occa-
sions, bloody crackdowns take place with numerous 
fatalities. The economic crisis adds to political griev-
ances. Cleavages and loyalty conflicts increase with-
in Belarusian silovik groups (the police and OMON15 
versus the army versus the KGB). Russian elites are 
also divided along their different interests and con-
nections to various Belarusian elite groups, and the 
Kremlin is concerned about getting bogged down in 
another conflict on top of the one in Ukraine. Hence, 
Russia decides to abandon Lukashenko, whom the 
deepening crisis forces to flee into exile.
Foreseeable interests and actions  
of Russia: 
Russia will play a key and active role 
during the crisis. Domestic instability 
in Belarus provides fertile ground for various levels 
of Russian meddling and interference. Moscow will 
dominate the post-Lukashenko period. The Kremlin 
is highly likely to retain its current role as the core 
guarantor of Belarusian security. As costs would be 
too high for Russia, military occupation is unlikely, 
but it cannot be ruled out. Russia would probably try 
to secure a military base on Belarusian soil. Mean-
while, Russian business circles will use the chaos to 
further privatize the key economic assets of Belarus. 
As the turbulence is likely to keep Western investors 
out, the sole rival of Russian capital will be Chinese 
investments.
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Role of the EU: 
Due to the lack of capabilities and will-
ingness to actively interfere, the EU’s 
role remains limited to damage control. 
The EU provides humanitarian assistance and large-
scale asylum for political refugees, supports Bela- 
rus’s remaining civil society, and cooperates with the 
OSCE to determine some kind of mediatory involve-
ment for the latter. Individual EU countries, led by 
the Baltic States and Poland, play an active role in 
trying to commit considerable resources to shaping 
domestic events in Belarus, but the EU as a whole 
does not. Sanctions remain in place and also get ex-
tended as more and more atrocities occur. Mean-
while, the uninterrupted transit of energy resources 
needs to be assured – requiring the EU and Russia 
to cooperate. Nevertheless, Russia’s lack of action 
to stop the initial crackdowns in Belarus will further 
weaken the EU’s willingness to seek any strategic 
normalization with Moscow.
SCENARIO 4: FORCE MAJEURE  
IN BELARUS
Situation: 
Lukashenko leaves his post unexpect-
edly, either driven out by Moscow or 
because of personal, possibly health- 
related, reasons. According to the current, as yet un-
reformed constitution, presidential elections are to 
be held within 30 to 70 days. Without the “archene-
my” Lukashenko in place, Belarusian society is quick-
ly polarized along different political values. The lowly 
institutionalized political system hampers normal, 
structured campaigning. Independent candidates 
participate in the presidential race, enjoying varying 
support from society and backed by various external 
players, primarily Russia and Poland-Lithuania, and 
possibly even Ukrainian elite groups.
Foreseeable interests and actions  
of Russia: 
a) If Moscow managed Lukashenko’s exit, 
the Kremlin is already prepared and has 
its own candidate. Due to this comparative advan-
tage over all other political forces, the pro-Kremlin 
candidate is highly likely to become the new 
president. 
b) If Lukashenko’s exit is a surprise to Moscow, the 
30 to 70 days left until the elections is an extremely 
short time. In this case, the Kremlin would be un-
likely to build up its own candidate from scratch. It 
is more likely, however, that in order to prepare for 
such a case and avoid any surprises, the Kremlin is 
already thinking about whom it sees as an accept-
able successor. Russia’s key short-term objective is 
to prevent any kind of pro-Western political player 
from becoming president.
Role of the EU: 
The EU’s priority is to ensure that free, 
fair, and transparent elections can take 
place – though this is apparently in con-
flict with Russia’s interests. The EU intends to make 
sure that proper international observation is con-
ducted, preferably via the OSCE. Some member 
states may get engaged in supporting certain pres-
idential candidates, but the participation of the EU 
as a whole remains limited. Sanctions will be main-
tained until proper, democratic elections take place.
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Conclusions
As of August 25, 2020, developments in Belarus are 
likely to evolve toward the first scenario, “Frozen 
Belarus,” possibly combined with the second one, 
“Slow-Moving, Transitional Belarus.” Lukashenko ap-
pears to be stabilizing his power, but – due to the 
massive deficit of legitimacy he is facing from both 
inside and outside the country – his control over so-
ciety will remain weak and contested. Russia is as-
sisting him by political, informational, and other 
means, thus enabling him to preserve his power, at 
least for a while. Inherent tensions and the regime’s 
inability to solve them, however, are leading Belarus 
towards an inevitable transition, which the Kremlin 
intends to manage closely.
Despite its dominant position, Moscow is now also 
in a peculiar situation as it tries to avoid an inter-
nal conflict while Belarus is becoming increasingly 
polarized. The Kremlin is facing tough choices about 
how to handle current tensions.16 A deep and pro-
longed political crisis in Belarus might result in the 
structural destabilization of the country, which 
could force an intervention that Russia has been try-
ing to avoid. A military occupation, as a measure of 
last resort mentioned in the “Blood-soaked Belarus” 
scenario, would come with many risks and high 
costs, including deaths and casualties that would 
occur if elements of the Belarusian armed forces 
or population openly resist.17 Meanwhile, support-
ing Lukashenko for too long may result in losing the 
sympathy of Belarusians for Russia for a long time to 
come. 18 
This intertwined set of problems may well make 
Russia open for a negotiated solution to be devel-
oped together with Lukashenko and the chief siloviki, 
as well as representatives of the opposition. The EU, 
and particularly Germany, would also need to be at 
the table because Berlin could closely coordinate 
with France as well as with Poland and Lithuania. All 
of these countries have influence over EU resourc-
es and the Belarusian opposition and can also play a 
critical role in preserving the EU’s unity in this crisis. 
16  For details on Russia’s options, see, for example, Trenin, ibid.
17  Gustav Gressel, “Russia’s military maneuvers at the Belarus border – a message to the West,” European Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2020: 
<https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_military_manoeuvres_at_the_belarus_border_a_message_to_t> (accessed August 25, 2020).
18  For example, Artyom Shreibman, “Мнение. Артем Шрайбман. Какой диалог может спасти страну,” [Opinion. Artyom Shreibman. What Kind of Dialogue 
Could Save the Country], Tut.by, August 24, 2020: <https://news.tut.by/economics/697754.html> (accessed August 25, 2020), and Trenin, ibid.
This leads to the conclusion that, although the EU is 
in a considerably weaker position than Russia when 
it comes to shaping events in Belarus, its hands are 
not empty. The most important tool it has is the pos-
sibility to influence the democratic opposition and 
provide immediate financial support. Moreover, ad-
ditional economic measures and political means 
are also available, such as allowing more Belaru-
sian goods into the single market. EU High Repre-
sentative Borrell announced recently that he is ready 
to visit Minsk. The EU is also suggesting to get the 
OSCE involved as a mediator because this would al-
low Russia to have an institutionalized oversight over 
the mediation efforts, thus hopefully building at least 
some trust in the Russian decision-makers. All in all, 
the EU indeed has the potential to become a valued, 
constructive partner in the settlement process – not 
as strong as Russia, but not unimportant either. 
Russia and the EU: Strategic Priorities Differ,  
but Short-Term Interests Largely Coincide 
It is important to recognize that the short-term in-
terests of the EU and Russia largely seem to match. 
Both want further bloodshed to be avoided, the cur-
rent crisis to be managed in a peaceful way, and the 
succession of Lukashenko to take place rather soon-
er than later. 
The preferences of the EU and Russia do, of course, 
partially differ in the long term – particularly in re-
gard to the process of Lukashenko’s succession. 
While the EU would advocate for free and fair elec-
tions, Russia would clearly intend to secure the 
victory of a candidate over whom Moscow can ex-
ercise strong influence. These two priorities do not 
necessarily conflict as the Belarusian people could 
freely elect a president who would favor preserving 
the country’s close ties to Russia.
By recognizing the shared interests of the EU and 
Russia, as well as the possibility of realizing them 
through coordinated policies, it might well be possi-
ble to keep Belarus from becoming the next theater 
of geopolitical confrontation between the East and 
West, Russia and Europe.
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